Racial Profiling and the Shooting Death of Irvin Landrum:
A Tragedy Waiting to Happen
 (DRAFT)

Submitted by Stanley O. Gaines, Jr.
to the Community/Police Relations Working Group
of the Claremont Community Coalition
March 19, 2000

Introduction    Racial Profiling in America    The Landrum Shooting    Recommendations

References

Addendum:  Recent Initiatives of the Claremont Police Chief
and Claremont City Manager concerning Racial Profiling

Today skin color makes you a suspect in America.  It makes you more likely to be
stopped, more likely to be searched, and more likely to be arrested and imprisoned.
-American Civil Liberties Union, Is Jim Crow Justice Alive and Well in America Today?  (undated)

    On February 17, 2000, the City of Claremont, CA announced the appointment of William Ellis as interim police chief of the Claremont Police Department.  Interim Chief Ellis’ duties include the following:  “Review police department policies, in light of recent experiences, for completeness, accuracy, and consistency with community values.  Recommend and implement modifications as appropriate. . . . Identify police department strengths and weaknesses. . . .” (City of Claremont, CA, February 17, 2000).  Although the City of Claremont did not specify the “recent experiences” mentioned above, it is likely that one such experience was the January 11, 1999 shooting death of an African American male motorist (i.e., Irvin Landrum, Jr.) by two members of the Claremont Police Department (i.e., Agent Kent Jacks and Officer Hany Hanna; see City of Claremont, CA, January 3, 2000).  The Landrum shooting has evoked enormous controversy within and outside of Claremont, not only because of lingering questions concerning the circumstances surrounding the shooting (Irvin Landrum Justice Organizing Committee, October 3, 1999), but also because of the behavior of the City Council and City Manager in response to criticism of the Claremont Police Department and the City of Claremont – behavior that, as the City of Claremont itself admitted, often has been “divisive” (City of Claremont, CA, January 3, 2000).
    The term “community values,” as used in the description of Interim Chief Ellis’ duties quoted above, is even more nebulous than the term “recent experiences.”  For example, according to its Web site, the City of Claremont “Respects traditional values while embracing new ideas” (City of Claremont, CA, undated).  In any event, unlike the directive for Interim Chief Ellis to determine the degree to which the Claremont Police Department’s policies and procedures are “consistent with community values” (City of Claremont, CA, February 17, 2000), no such directive has been made specifically to determine the extent to which the Claremont Police Department’s policies and procedures are consistent with the Principles of Good Policing:  Avoiding Violence between Police and Citizens, published by the United States Department of Justice (March 1993).  The lack of such a directive does not bode well for Claremont residents’ efforts at achieving justice or reconciliation with regard to the Landrum shooting, especially when one considers that the City of Claremont’s own Community Dialogue Planning Committee is barred from discussing “issues that might be related to this incident” (City of Claremont, CA, January 25, 2000).
    In the present paper, I shall argue that the Claremont Police Department’s Training Manual section on “Officer Survival” (Claremont Police Department, November 13, 1997) legitimizes racial profiling -- a police practice that that is common in southern California (American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California, February 10, 2000) and throughout the United States (American Civil Liberties Union, June 1999), despite the fact that federal guidelines specifically discourage such a practice (U. S. Department of Justice, March 1993).  Moreover, I shall argue that the City of Claremont’s “Fact Sheet” on the Landrum shooting (City of Claremont, August 4, 1999) describes circumstances that, while consistent in certain respects with the Claremont Police Department’s Training Manual section on “Officer Survival” (Claremont Police Department, November 13, 1997), also is consistent with the phenomenon of racial profiling, as documented by the American Civil Liberties Union (June 1999).  I hasten to add that, although I have prepared the present paper for submission to the Community/Police Relations Working Group of the Claremont Community Coalition, the views expressed in the present paper are mine alone.

Racial Profiling in America

     According to the United States Department of Justice (March 1993), police departments originated in the American South, as state-sanctioned attempts to aid slaveholders in capturing runaway Black slaves.  Thus, from an historical perspective, relations between police officers and individual African Americans often have been strained at best (and violent at worst).  Consistent with the Department of Justice overview, the American Civil Liberties Union (June 1999) identified racial profiling as a police practice dating back to the slavery era:
 
…There is nothing new about [racial profiling].  Police abuse against people of color is a legacy of African American enslavement, repression, and legal inequality.  Indeed, during hearings of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (‘The Kerner Commission’) in the fall of 1967 where more than 130 witnesses testified about the events leading up to the urban riots that had taken place in 150 cities the previous summer, one of the complaints that came up repeatedly was ‘the stopping of Negroes on foot or in cars without obvious basis.’  (p. 2)


     One need not look to the distant past, or even beyond Los Angeles County, to find evidence of racial profiling.  On February 10, 2000, the American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California announced that it had filed a federal lawsuit on behalf of five men of color (three African Americans and two Latinos) who, while driving in Los Angeles, had been stopped and harassed by members of the Los Angeles Police Department during the preceding year.  As the following quote from the Southern California ACLU’s lawsuit attests, the LAPD’s practice of racial profiling not only led to harassment in all five cases but also led to volatile situations in which the motorists’ lives potentially were in danger:

    In many respects, the Plaintiffs in this case represent a cross section of the nation.  They come from divergent economic backgrounds and from different geographic locations of the United States.  Today, they engage in a variety of different occupations here in Los Angeles.  Carlos Gonzalez teaches math in a public school.  David Askew is an actor.  Timothy Campbell is a real estate developer.  Alberto Lovato is a professional musician.  And Tonye Allen is a freelance photographer.  They share one common experience in common, however.  They are all people of color, who, within the past year, were the victims of degrading, humiliating, and terrifying encounters with the LAPD as they drove their vehicles on the streets of this City on their way to work or home.  These five separate episodes reflect a deeply disturbing pattern.  Each of the Plaintiffs was followed, stopped, and detained for no valid reason by the LAPD.  Three of the Plaintiffs were ordered out of their vehicles – two of them at gunpoint – and searched long before the police even asked for or looked at their driver’s licenses or registration papers.  Three of the Plaintiffs were handcuffed.  One of the Plaintiffs had a gun aimed at his head as he was ordered to lie face down on the ground; two other Plaintiffs saw armed officers place their hands on their holstered guns, ready to draw and fire at them.  One of the Plaintiffs was locked in a jail cell for over two hours.  Three of the Plaintiffs were, without any legitimate basis, suspected by the LAPD of stealing their vehicles.  One of the Plaintiffs was told the absurd tale that he was stopped because he had been impeding traffic, even though at the time, there were no other cars on the road.  And all of the Plaintiffs feared that, with one false move, they could be killed.

    In reality, the Plaintiffs committed no offense, but instead, were stopped for “driving while black or brown,” or “DWB.”  In short, what happened to the Plaintiffs would not have occurred if their skin were white and not dark.  (p. 1-2)

     In all five incidents described above, men of color were treated as “suspicious persons” – not because they had said or done anything wrong, but because they happened to have the “wrong” complexion (at least in the minds of the officers who stopped them).  Ironically, although California public officials no longer are allowed to take individuals’ ethnicity into account when hiring state employees or when admitting students to state colleges and universities, officers in the state’s largest police department still are allowed to take individuals’ ethnicity into account when deciding whether to stop and detain motorists.  The U. S. Department of Justice (March 1993) explicitly cautions against officers’ stereotyping of persons of color as “suspicious persons”:

    Over the years, the concept of “suspicious person” has become less-clearly defined as the individual’s right of freedom of movement has been reinforced.  At one time, “suspicious” could mean merely encountering an individual of one race in a neighborhood populated by members of another race, at any time of the day.  That evolved to a late-night situation and eventually to a requirement that other circumstances be present.  The difficulty in the inability to clearly define and articulate “suspicious” is that it creates the perception of harassment on the part of the individual stopped and questioned.  Obviously, this can quickly result in tension between officer and citizen, with the possibility of the citizen resisting an arrest that may be questioned by the community and overturned by the courts.  (p. 23)

     The U. S. Department of Justice’s commentary seems almost prophetic in its description of the volatility inherent in the unjustifiable nature of traffic stops arising from the police practice of racial profiling.  The Southern California ACLU lawsuit is a predictable outcome of racial profiling.  Perhaps the one silver lining behind the cloud of the LAPD’s identification of innocent citizens as “suspicious persons” is that, in all five instances described above, the men were fortunate enough to escape with their lives.  In contrast, when Irvin Landrum drove through Claremont on the night of January 11, 1999, he was not so fortunate.

Racial Profiling and the Landrum Shooting

     The Claremont Police Department’s Training Manual section on “Officer Survival” (November 13, 1997) contains a subsection on “Officer Fatality Information” that tacitly encourages officers to engage in racial profiling.  The subsection informs officers-in-training that “The highest number of officers killed were killed by males with an even split between black and white” (p. III-15).  Such a statement suggests that a disproportionately high number of officer killings have been committed by African American men.  It is all too tempting – and, perhaps, all too easy – for one to make the additional, unwarranted inference that a disproportionately high number of African American men kill police officers.  The process of incorrectly associating rare but negative behaviors (e.g., officer killings) with rarely encountered but negatively stereotyped members of ethnic minority groups (e.g., African American men) has been termed illusory correlation by social psychologists (see Fiske & Taylor, 1991).
    The subsection on “Officer Fatality Information” (Claremont Police Department, November 13, 1997) also states, “The highest percentage of weapons used to kill officers were handguns.  Number one being the .38 caliber” and “The highest percentage of the shootings will be outdoors, in April, between the hours of 2200 and 2400 [i.e., between 10:00 pm and 12 midnight] on a Friday” (p. III-15).  As soon as Irvin Landrum drove through Claremont, he already matched the Claremont Police Department Training Manual’s “profile” of a potential “cop killer” in several respects:  He was (1) an African American, (2) and a male, (3) who was outdoors, (4) late at night.  Interestingly, the City of Claremont’s “Fact Sheet” specifically maintained that when a Claremont police officer passed by Irvin Landrum, “The officer was not able to observe the gender or race of the driver of the vehicle, it was night time, the officer and Mr. Landrum were travelling in opposite directions and Mr. Landrum was travelling almost 20 miles over the speed limit” (p. 1).  Nevertheless, one can safely assume that by the time the officer stopped Irvin Landrum, the officer had ascertained Irvin Landrum’s gender and ethnicity.
    Even if one were to accept the City of Claremont’s “Fact Sheet” concerning the Landrum shooting – and, indeed, the Irvin Landrum Justice Organizing Committee (October 3, 1999) has challenged numerous statements made in the “Fact Sheet” – the document itself contains information that supports the premise that the police officers engaged in racial profiling on January 11, 1999.  As noted above, the “cop killer” profile contained in the Claremont Police Department Training Manual implies that an African American male, driving late at night, already qualifies as a "suspicious person"; if one falls prey to the “illusory correlation” described above, then the next inferential step would be to assume that the “suspicious person” also is carrying a handgun.  As the City of Claremont’s “Fact Sheet” indicates, the officer on the scene acted on that assumption, even though Irvin Landrum ostensibly had been stopped for speeding:  “Mr. Landrum was on probation for carrying a concealed weapon.  The officer asked Landrum if he was carrying a gun.  Landrum responded that he was not carrying a gun”  (City of Claremont, August 4, 1999, p. 2).
    The City of Claremont’s “Fact Sheet” omits the fact that Irvin Landrum was not on probation for carrying a handgun.  Exactly why the officer on the scene would ask whether Irvin Landrum was carrying a handgun, when in fact Irvin Landrum had been placed on probation for carrying brass knuckles, never has been explained by the City of Claremont or the Claremont Police Department.  However, the “cop killer” profile contained in the Claremont Police Department Training Manual is likely to lead one to associate an African American man, driving late at night, with a handgun – even though neither the offense at hand (i.e., speeding) nor Irvin Landrum’s previous probation (i.e., carrying brass knuckles) would justify such an association.
    The City of Claremont’s “Fact Sheet” goes on to state, “The officer, using his discretion, wrote a citation for no driver’s license and no registration but only warned and did not cite Mr. Landrum for speeding” (City of Claremont, August 4, 1999).  If the police encounter with Irvin Landrum had ended at that moment, then it is likely that Irvin Landrum would have left Claremont alive.  The incident still would have qualified as racial profiling; but at least Irvin Landrum’s fate would not have been different from the fate of any of the men of color cited as plaintiffs in the ongoing ACLU of Southern California lawsuit against the LAPD.  However, as the City of Claremont’s “Fact Sheet” indicates, the incident took a tragic turn:
    The officer called for a backup so he could search Mr. Landrum’s car as was offered.  Calling for a back up on a vehicle search is standard procedure.  When the backup unit arrived, the officer started to pat down Mr. Landrum for weapons, in accordance with standard procedure.  Mr. Landrum stepped back, drew a revolver from his waist band, pointed the weapon at the officers and yelled, “You’re both dead.”  The officers immediately began to retreat, pulling their guns and firing in fear of their lives.  (City of Claremont, August 4, 1999, p. 2)
       Undoubtedly, the “cop killer” profile contained in the Claremont Police Department Training Manual would be sufficient to instill fear in any police officer who happened to encounter an African American man, driving late at night.  What is doubtful, though, is whether the City of Claremont’s “Fact Sheet” accurately depicts the Claremont police officers’ fatal shooting of Irvin Landrum.  The “Fact Sheet” states unequivocally that Irvin Landrum pointed a handgun at the officers.  However, when they were interviewed during the ensuing Sheriff’s Department investigation, the officers were anything but unequivocal.  The officers said vaguely that they “heard the gun shot and saw the muzzle flash” (Irvin Landrum Justice Organizing Committee, October 3, 1999, p. 4).  Even those assertions on the part of the officers are dubious at best; as the Los Angeles Times reported, “Sheriff’s lab tests of the large .45-caliber Smith & Wesson that Landrum allegedly shot showed that the gun had not been fired and bore no fingerprints.  It was last registered to the deceased police chief of Ontario” (January 11, 1999, p. 11).
     The U. S. Department of Justice (March 1993) emphasizes that police officers ultimately bear most of the burden for ensuring that encounters with citizens do not escalate into violence:  “…[I]t is recognized that citizens bear a part of the responsibility for the tenor of relations with police.  However, it is the police role which is key because of the unique power that is a part of it” (p. 26).  Moreover, the U. S. Department of Justice cautions officers to avoid letting irrational fear overcome them during traffic stops in particular:
    Police officers make thousands of traffic stops daily.  Like other human beings, they have a tendency to become complacent when performing tasks that become routine.  These circumstances create an environment where basic procedural mistakes are made that may result in the officer being assaulted or using force to resolve a problem that could have been avoided.  The dilemma faced by police administrators lies in ensuring that officers avoid mistakes, without introducing a level of fear that causes officers to overreact to non-threatening situations.  (March 1993, p. 22)
     On the one hand, the Claremont Police Department Training Manual section on “Officer Survival” certainly instructs police officers to avoid making mistakes.  On the other hand, the section on “Officer Survival” fails to instruct officers to avoid allowing themselves to be consumed by irrational fear.  Even worse, the manual seems to fuel precisely the type of fear that the U. S. Department of Justice has identified as potentially contributing to officers’ mistakes:  “In closing, will you die because someone wants you dead?  Will you die because it’s the suspect’s main option and your only option?  No, No, and Never.  You have a chance, use it; you have a choice, make it; you have a brain, use it; and you have a life, protect it” (Claremont Police Department, November 13, 1997, p. III-16).
    Missing Information regarding the Roles of the Chain of Command on January 11, 1999
 In its “Fact Sheet,” the City of Claremont states, “As is Claremont’s standard practice, immediately following the incident, the Sheriff’s Department was called in to investigate the shooting.  Having the Sheriff’s Department investigate provides an independent review” (August 4, 1999, p. 1).  However, the “Fact Sheet” never mentions the chain of command identified by the Claremont Police Department Policy Manual (which is separate from the Claremont Police Department Training Manual) that is to be notified in the event of an officer-related shooting..  In the section on “Use of Deadly Force – Firearms,” the Claremont Police Department Policy Manual states, “A memo to the division Captain, routed through the chain of command, shall be required in every incident in which a firearm has been discharged, whether accidental or intentional” (April 28, 1998, p. 4-2).  Moreover, in its “Police Department Notification Policy,” the Claremont Police Department Policy Manual lists a chain of command that includes the Police Chief, City Manager, and City Council members:

    Significant incidents, such as homicides, kidnap, major structure or large brush fire, officer-involved shooting, or injured officer require immediate notification to the Police Chief, regardless of the time of day or day of week.  The Chief will then determine whether the City Manager will be immediately notified or if notification will wait until the next day.  If the Chief immediately notifies the City Manager, they will mutually decide if the Mayor should be notified, who will notify the Mayor, and when the Mayor will be notified.  If the Mayor is notified, the Mayor and the person notifying the Mayor will determine how and when the Council will be notified.  In the absence of the Mayor, the Mayor Pro Tem shall be notified.  (Claremont Police Department, November 13, 1995)

     Inspection of the above paragraph reveals that the shooting victim’s next of kin and the Sheriff’s Department are not mentioned as individuals or entities to be notified immediately.  In addition, the roles of the City Manager and the Mayor within the chain of command of persons to be notified in the event of an officer-related shooting are much more prominent that the City of Claremont’s “Fact Sheet” would lead one to believe.  From the “Fact Sheet,” it is unclear as to (1) whether the division Captain, Police Chief, City Manager, and Mayor actually were contacted immediately following the Landrum shooting; and (2) how the division Captain, Police Chief, City Manager, and Mayor immediately responded (if at all).

    To put it mildly, the Claremont Police Department and the City of Claremont have been less than     forthcoming with regard to the circumstances surrounding the Landrum shooting.  A visit to the City of Claremont’s Web site will not even yield the aforementioned “Fact Sheet”; however, that document is available via the Irvin Landrum Justice Organizing Committee Web site.  The City Council’s prohibition against any discussion of the Landrum shooting by its Community Dialogue Planning Committee only fuels speculation that the Claremont Police Department and the City of Claremont are engaging in an ongoing, systematic cover-up of the actual sequence of events that led two Claremont police officers to shoot and kill Irvin Landrum, Jr. on the night of January 11, 1999.

Recommendations and Conclusion

     Throughout this paper, I have focused on racial profiling as a likely precursor to the shooting death of Irvin Landrum.  Consequently, a variety of related topics (e.g., use of deadly force, community policing) receive little, if any, coverage in the present paper.  I hope to address those related topics in future reports.  In the meantime, based on my interpretation of the information at hand, I offer the following recommendations to the Claremont Community Coalition (to whom the present paper is to be submitted):
     Short-term goal:  Hire a private investigator to find out how a gun that was last registered to a deceased Ontario police chief eventually came to rest near the body of Irvin Landrum on the streets of Claremont.  The gun that the City of Claremont’s “Fact Sheet” claims to have been fired by Irvin Landrum was not fired on the night of January 11, 1999.  In fact, prior to January 11, 1999, no evidence has placed Irvin Landrum anywhere near the gun in question.  The last person known to have possessed the gun before January 11, 1999 was a deceased Ontario police chief.  If a private investigator can determine who acquired the gun from the deceased Ontario police chief (as well as when, how, and why) prior to the night of the Landrum shooting, then the Claremont Community Coalition will have made a meaningful contribution toward its stated mission of racial justice and reconciliation in Claremont.
     Long-term goal:  Hire an attorney to oversee a more comprehensive investigation into the circumstances surrounding the shooting death of Irvin Landrum.  The mystery of the non-smoking gun represents the tip of the iceberg regarding the Landrum shooting.  The City of Claremont’s “Fact Sheet” is silent on the issue of the chain of command that, according to the Claremont Police Department Policy Manual, was to have been informed concerning the Landrum shooting.  A comprehensive investigation, which is likely to require more than the efforts of a single private investigator, probably will be necessary if the entire sequence of events on the night of January 11, 1999 is to be uncovered.  Such an investigation, funded by the Claremont Community Coalition, would do even more to achieve the Coalition’s stated mission of racial justice and reconciliation in Claremont.
     In closing, I return to the none-too-envious task facing Interim Police Chief Ellis.  As the present paper indicates, the Claremont Police Department Training Manual deviates substantially from U. S. Department of Justice guidelines on community-police relations, especially with regard to racial profiling.  Hopefully, the interim chief will do more than consider the Training Manual in light of “community values.”  In order to make a lasting, positive contribution to community-police relations, the interim chief should make every effort to bring the Claremont Police Department Training Manual in line with federal guidelines concerning the practice of racial profiling.  Otherwise, the circumstances surrounding the shooting death of a young Black man driving (or even walking) through Claremont late at night are likely to emerge again in the years to come.

References

 American Civil Liberties Union (June 1999).  Driving While Black:  Racial profiling on our nation’s highways.  [On-line].  Available:  http://www.aclu.org/profiling/report/index.html

 American Civil Liberties Union (undated).  Is Jim Crow justice alive and well in America today?  [On-line].  Available:  http://www.aclu.org/profiling

 American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California (February 10, 2000).  ACLU sues to bring a halt to racial profiling of motorists by LAPD.  [On-line].  Available:
http://www.aclu-sc.org/newsreleases/000209DWB.htm

 City of Claremont, CA (August 4, 1999).  Landrum incident – fact sheet.  [On-line].  Available:  http://bernard.pitzer.edu/~hfairchi/Landrum/FactSheet/html

 City of Claremont, CA (January 3, 2000).  City Council issues statement regarding city’s actions related to Landrum shooting.  [On-line].  Available:  http://www.ci.claremont.ca.us/what%…s/landrum%20actions%20statement.htm

 City of Claremont, CA (January 25, 2000).  Charge statement to Community Dialogue Planning Committee.  [On-line].  Available:  http://www.ci.claremont.ca.us/what%…27s%20news/charge%20statement.htm

 City of Claremont, CA (February 17, 2000).  Interim police chief appointed.  [On-line]. Available:  http://www.ci.claremont.ca.us/what%…im%20Police%20chief%20appointed.htm

 City of Claremont, CA (undated).  City of Claremont, California.  [On-line].  Available:  http://www.ci.claremont.ca.us/splash/htm

 Claremont, CA Police Department (1997).  Training manual.  Claremont, CA:  Claremont, CA Police Department.

Claremont, CA Police Department (1998).  Policy manual.  Claremont, CA:  Claremont, CA Police Department.

 Fiske, S. T., & Taylor, S. E. (1991).  Social cognition, 2nd ed.  New York:  McGraw-Hill.

 Irvin Landrum Justice Organizing Committee (October 3, 1999). On the killing of Irvin Landrum, Jr.:  Debunking the City of Claremont’s “Fact Sheet”.   [On-line].  Available:  http://bernard.pitzer.edu/~hfairchi/Landrum/DebunkCCFacts.html

 Mozingo, J. (2000, January 11).  Police slaying still torments Claremont.  Los Angeles Times, pp. A1, A19.

  U. S. Department of Justice (March 1993).  Principles of good policing:  Avoiding violence between police and citizens.  Washington, DC:  Community Relations Service.
 


Addendum:
Recent Initiatives of the Claremont Police Chief
and Claremont City Manager concerning Racial Profiling

Submitted by Stanley O. Gaines, Jr.
to the Community/Police Relations Working Group
of the Claremont Community Coalition
March 26, 2000

     On March 24, 2000, the Inland Valley Our Times reported, “[Claremont] Interim Police Chief Bill Ellis and City Manager Glenn Southard outlined a nine-point plan to gather data on racial profiling and make the department more responsive and open” (p. A1).  This prospective plan on the part of the police chief and the city manager certainly is encouraging.  However, I am discouraged by the failure of the interim police chief and the city manager to gather retrospective data on police officers’ unrecorded stops during the years immediately preceding or following the January 11, 1999 shooting death of Black motorist Irvin Landrum, Jr. by two Claremont police officers.  Currently, several individuals and organizations unaffiliated with the Claremont Police Department or the City Council – including the Data Collection Working Group of the Claremont Community Coalition Concerned – are gathering precisely such data, in the form of accounts by persons who apparently have been stopped by members of the Claremont Police Department simply because they were persons of color.  Moreover, Claremont police officers and City Council members have heard many of these accounts (e.g., during City Council meetings and Irvin Landrum Justice Organizing Committee rallies) but have failed to engage in any follow-up work (e.g., informing citizens how to file complaints against police officers, a process that is much more cumbersome than the Inland Valley Our Times article would imply).

     Even more discouraging, in my opinion, is the claim by the interim police chief that the Claremont Police Department’s Training Manual prohibits racial profiling.  In response to my query as to exactly which section of the manual actually prohibits racial profiling, the interim police chief pointed to a single sentence:  “Officers shall stop persons on the basis of all available information, not solely on the basis of race or ethnicity” (April 28, 1998, p. 1-6).  Unfortunately, that sentence does not prohibit racial profiling.  In fact, a review of my paper on racial profiling reveals that the above sentence is entirely consistent with the portion of the Claremont Police Department’s Training Manual that encourages officers to use the profile of potential “cop killers” as a pretext for stopping Black male motorists and pedestrians late at night.

     Interestingly, the interim police chief never referred to the Claremont Police Department’s Training Manual, which is a separate document from the Policy Manual.  I am concerned that the Claremont Police Department is trying to avoid admitting that its Training Manual encourages racial profiling.  Overall, the recent initiative by the interim police chief and the city manager addresses the practices, while failing to address the policies, of the Claremont Police Department.
References

 Bush, T. (2000, March 24).  Claremont officers to record all stops.  Inland Valley Our Times, p. A1.
Claremont, CA Police Department (1998).  Policy manual.  Claremont, CA:  Claremont, CA Police Department.

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